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INSPECTING THE MINE INSPECTOR:
WHY THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION DOES NOT BAR
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENT MINE INSPECTIONS
INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the mining industry is still
plagued with accidents that injure and kill mine workers each year. Since
the year 2000, there have been several mining accidents which caught
national attention. In January 2006, an explosion at the Sago Mine killed
12 miners and seriously injured another.' This accident garnered national
attention to the working conditions and safety of miners.2 Similarly, one
of the first cases heard by Chief Justice John Roberts, in October 2005,
concerned a lawsuit against the federal government alleging that the
miner's death was a result of a negligent inspection by a federal mine
inspector.3 Additionally, on September 23, 2001, an explosion at a
Brookwood, Alabama coal mine killed 13 miners. 4 While federal
workplace safety regulations of mines have dramatically improved the
safety and health of all miners, such a continued increase in safety is
dependent upon competent inspections by federal safety inspectors. 5
With approximately 230 miners injured and at least one death occurring
every week in 2003,6 the question remains what a mine worker can do to
ensure that government inspectors conduct their annual inspections

1. Gardiner Harris, Endemic Problem of Safety in Coal Mining, NY TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at
13A.

2.

Id.

3. United States v. Olson, 124 S. Ct. 510 (2005).
4. Press Release, United Mine Workers of America, UMWA Investigation Report Details
Conditions Leading to the September 2001 Brookwood (Ala.) Mine Disaster (Jan. 22, 2003), at
http://www.umwa.org/brookwood/012203.shtml.
At
a
Glance,
at
Safety
and
Health
5. MSHA,
Mine

http://msha.gov/MSHAINFO/InjuryRates/CYMSHAInjurylnfo2004-06-14.doc

(last visited Jan. 10,

2006).

6. Id.
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competently in order to maintain a safe working environment.7 One of
the options available to a miner or his/her estate, in the case of death, is
to bring a tort action against the federal government for a federal mine
inspector's negligent inspection which proximately lead to a miner's
injury or death. Currently, the United States courts of appeals are split
over whether the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA") bars such a lawsuit. 8
This Note argues that the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA should not bar an injured miner's lawsuit against the government
for a federal inspector's negligent inspection of a mine. The federal
government is statutorily required to annually inspect all mines in the
United States to ensure that each meets certain minimum safety and
health standards. 9 When a negligent inspection causes either an injury or
death of a mine worker, the government should be liable for its agent,
who could have prevented such accident by exercising the required duty
of care in performing his/her job.
Section I of this Note explores the history and requirements of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Mine Act").' 0 Section II
of this Note explains the purpose and current state of the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA. Section III discusses the current circuit
split concerning whether the discretionary function exception applies to
the actions of Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA")
inspectors while performing their duties under the Mine Act. Using
decisions from five different circuit courts, this section analyzes and
explains how the circuit courts have applied the discretionary function
exception to the inspections of MSHA mine inspectors. Section IV of
this Note explores how the discretionary function exception applies to
other industries where the government acts as a safety regulator. This
section compares the structure of the mine regulations to other industries
where the federal government conducts mandatory safety inspections.
Section V presents the Note's argument that negligent inspections
by MSHA inspectors are not grounded in policy, thus courts are
empowered with the subject matter jurisdiction to hear such tort actions,
provided the plaintiff establishes the necessary elements of the cause of
action. The Note presents four policy reasons why the discretion
exercised by mine inspectors is not grounded in "social, economic, or
political policy" and therefore, is not protected by the exception. Section
7.
8.
9.
10.

See30 U.S.C. § 813-14(2000).
See infra Section III for a discussion of the circuit split.
See 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (2000).
Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 USC §§ 801-954 (2000).
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VI will address further restrictions placed upon any injured or deceased
plaintiff-miner seeking to bring such a tort action. This section
concludes that allowing such tort suits to be brought will not "open the
floodgates" of litigation. Instead, workers still have requirements to be
met in order to successfully recover in tort suits against the federal
government.
I. THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act has gone through more
than 100 years of extensive legislative development as Congress has
tried to improve the safety and health of the American mine worker. The
process first began in 1891, when Congress passed the first federal
statute designed to govern the safety of mines." By 1910, after fatality
rates of mine workers had increased to an astonishing 2,000 deaths
annually, Congress acted to improve the working conditions of the
miner.12 In response to the rising fatality rate, Congress created the first
agency charged with ensuring the safety of mine workers, the Bureau of
Mines, which was established only as a research agency and granted no
regulatory powers. 13 Four more major pieces of legislation were passed
in 1941, 1952, 1966, and 1969, each progressively granting more
regulatory authority to the Bureau, improving enforcement measures,
and increasing sanctions.' 4 In 1973, the Mining Enforcement and Safety
Administration was created as a separate entity from the Bureau of
Mines, and this new agency took over the functions of protecting the
health and safety of miners previously granted to the Bureau.15 After
nearly 115 years, Congress passed its last legislation, the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, which currently governs the mine
inspection process. 16 The driving force behind these Congressional
actions was a response to the numerous catastrophes and diseases that
were prevalent throughout the mining industry. 17 The reduction in the
11. MSHA,
History
of
Mine
Safety
and
Health
Legislation,
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
12. Id.

at

13. J. David McAteer, The FederalMine Safety and Health Act of 1977: Preservinga Law
that Works, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1996).
14. Id.

15. MSHA,
History
of
Mine
Safety
and
Health
Legislation,
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
16.

Id.

17.

McAteer, supra note 13, at 1111.
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number of fatalities that has occurred over the years is in direct
correlation with improved legislation and stronger laws, allowing
scholars to conclude that the progressively tougher laws have
succeeded.18
One of the first priorities of the Mine Act was to transfer the
responsibilities for creating and enforcing the regulations of the Act
from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor, where
the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") was created.19
The Mine Act is essentially implemented through two separate entities;
the MSHA, acting through the Secretary of Labor, and the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission. 20 The MSHA's main
responsibility is "to develop, promulgate, and enforce" the safety and
health standards as specified in the Mine Act. 21 The safety and health
standards that are developed by the MSHA arecodified in title 30 of the
Code of Federal Regulations sections 1 through 104.22 The Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission, an independent entity of the
Department of Labor, serves as the adjudication authority reviewing all
disputes arising under the Mine Act. 3
The regulations of the Mine Act aim to regulate all aspects of
miner's safety and health.24 The main purpose of the Mine Act, as
declared by Congress, is "the health and safety of its most precious
resource-the miner," placing as its primary responsibility the
prevention of dangerous and unhealthy practices by mine operators.25
The Mine Act grants two chief powers to the MSHA. First, the Mine Act
gives the authority to the MSHA, acting through the Secretary of Labor,
to promulgate administrative regulations that establish general and26
mandatory standards for which all mine operators must comply.

18. Id.at 1107.
19. MSHA,
History
of
Mine
Safety
and
Health
Legislation,
at
http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.htm (last visited Oct. 16,2005).
20. W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of Authority Under the Mine Act: Is The
Authority to Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary Of Labor or in the Review

Commission?, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 1063, 1065-66 (1998).
21. 30 U.S.C. § 81 l(a) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C § 557(a) (2000).
22. Mine Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, 30 C.F.R. §§ 1-104 (2005).
23. 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) (2000).
24. Karen L. Johnson, The FederalMine Safety and Health Act of 1977: Is It Suffering From
a Mid-Life Crisis?, 78 DENV. U. L. REv. 441, 441 (2001).

25. 30 U.S.C. § 801(a); 30 U.S.C. § 801(g).
26. Id. These regulations are codified in 30 C.F.R §§ 1-104; see also Cooley v. United States,
791 F. Supp. 1294, 1302 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (providing an overview of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act in the context of a wrongful death suit brought against the federal government following
a methane gas explosion).
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Second, the Mine Act empowers the MSHA to both conduct annual
inspections and investigations, and to issue citations or orders to mine
operators to ensure compliance with the regulations of the Mine Act.2 7 In
performance of these duties, MSHA inspectors have generally been
given a considerable degree of discretion.2 8 Where a plaintiff alleges that
a MSHA inspector negligently performed his or her duty as authorized
by the Mine Act, this negligence by the inspector does not in itself create
a private cause of action, but instead, defines the duty, with liability for
breach of duty being founded in the FTCA.2 9 In this respect, the
government relies heavily on the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA to bar liability from claims by miners against the government for
the negligent actions of a MSHA inspector that results in the injury or
death of a miner.
When the Act was first passed, there were 20,000 mines subject to
the Mine Act, employing nearly 500,000 miners. 30 Although these
numbers have decreased in the subsequent years, the latest figures show
that there are still approximately 14,000 active31 mines and 320,000
miners that are currently affected by the Mine Act.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity barred tort actions against the federal
government.3 2 In 1946, Congress changed the law, and made the federal
government liable for the torts committed by its employees within the
scope of their employment.33 This means, for example, that a tort
committed by a federal government employee, committed outside the
scope of their employment, such as driving to the grocery store, would
27. See 30 U.S.C. § 813-4
28. Cooley, 791 F. Supp. at 1303.
29. Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (6th Cir. 1981).
30. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 458; see also 30 U.S.C. § 803 (specifying the mines subject
to coverage under this Act).
31. MSHA,
Mine
Safety
and
Health
At
a
Glance,
at
http://msha.gov/MSHAINFO/InjuryRates/CYMSHAInjurylnfo2004-06-14.doc (last visited Jan. 10,
2006).
32. See Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the FederalTort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365, 366 (1995)

(explaining that prior to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress passed specific acts which granted
relief to victims of torts committed by federal employees in the scope of their employment).
33. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2000) (explaining that lawsuits are allowed when the
employee was "acting within the scope of his office or employment").
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not subject the government to liability. Furthermore, the federal
government was only liable for such a tort when the action committed by
the federal employee would constitute a tort had it been committed by a
private citizen in the state in which the action occurred.34 However,
Congress did not completely remove the doctrine of sovereign
when the government
immunity, but retained a bar to tort liability,
35
functions.,
"discretionary
certain
exercised
The discretionary function exception bars liability and denies
subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts for any suit which is based
on:
an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due
care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.36
Congress failed to define, in either the statute or the legislative
history, what constitutes a "discretionary function., 37 The definition of
discretionary function, instead, has evolved from several Supreme Court
decisions.38 Often due to the factual nature of the exception, courts have
been unable to define the precise contours of the discretionary function
exception, which results in leaving ambiguity in its application.3 9 While
the protection offered by the exception to certain situations has oscillated
over the course of its existence,40 today the Supreme Court uses a two-part
test to determine applicability.
Over the course of the last fifty years, the discretionary function
exception has been applied, to deny government liability, where the
34. See D. Scott Barash, Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception and Mandatory
Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1300, 1302 (1987) (examining the requirement that a FTCA claim
be an analogous private tort in the state in which it is committed).
35. See id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).
37. See Zillman, supra note 32, at 367.
38. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984); Berkovitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531 (1988); United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
39. See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813 (explaining "it is unnecessary-and indeed
impossible-to define with precision every contour of the discretionary function exception"); see
also Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (remanding the case to the district court to determine if the
alleged conduct was made in the context of a protected policy judgment); Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315
(1991) (holding that the discretion exercised by the federal regulators met the two-prong Berkovitz
test and thus was protected discretion).
40. Compare VarigAirlines,467 U.S. 797 (1984) with Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
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government is unable to establish the two-part Berkovitz test.4' "[T]he
basic inquiry concerning the application of the discretionary function
exception is whether the challenged acts of a Government employeewhatever his or her rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress
intended to shield from tort liability.

'42

In analyzing whether the

exception bars liability, courts examine: 1) whether the federal employee
exercised choice, and assuming that choice was exercised, 2) was that
choice the kind that Congress intended to protect.4 3 If a court finds that
the employee exercised choice and that choice was the kind Congress
intended to protect, then the exception bars any federal government
liability. If, however, a court finds that either the first or the second
prongs are not met, then the government cannot use the exception to bar
tort liability.
The first part of the exception's test is to determine if in committing
the questioned action, the federal employee exercised choice. 44 In
Berkovitz v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the first
prong of the test derives from the discretionary nature of the exception.45
Because the exception itself requires some kind of "discretionary
function," the employee must exercise choice in order to be subject to
the protections of the exception.4 6 The Court went on to explain that
when a statute or regulation proscribes a certain kind of action, an
employee cannot exercise choice and thus the exception cannot apply.47
Where a federal employee is compelled to fulfill a mandatory directive,
no choice can be inferred from following such required action.48 Inorder
to move onto the second prong, a court must necessarily find that the
employee exercised choice.4 9
Assuming arguendo that an employee did exercise choice, the next
part of the test questions whether the discretion exercised was in
furtherance of the policy underlying the regulatory scheme. 50 The
Supreme Court in Berkovitz explained that the second prong of the test

41.
U.S. 315
42.
43.

See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984); Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531 (1988); Gaubert, 499
(1991).
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813.
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at

536).
44.

Id.

45.

See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.

46.

See id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; Gaubert,499 U.S. at 322-23.
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derives from "Congress' desire to 'prevent judicial second-guessing of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, or
political policy through the medium of an action in tort."' 51 Once it is
determined that an employee exercises his/her choice in furtherance of a
"social, economic or political policy," then the second prong is met.52 In
United States v. Gaubert, the Supreme Court explained that when a
regulation, agency, or governmental policy (either expressed or implied
through a statute) allows a federal government employee to exercise
discretion, that discretion is presumed to be grounded in policy. 53 This
means that a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that a
governmental policy was not expressed or implied in an employee's
exercise of discretion. The Court further elaborated that the focus of the
investigation should be on the employee's subjective intent in exercising
the discretion given by the statute or regulation.54 The Court concluded
in Gaubert by explaining that when "Congress has delegated the
authority to an independent agency or to the Executive Branch to
implement the general provisions of a regulatory statute and to issue
regulations to that end. . ." then such action is protected by the
discretionary function exception. 55 In Gaubert, the federal regulator had
been given broad latitude in deciding when and how to exert its
authority.56 In order to invoke the protections of the discretionary
function exception the federal government must 1) demonstrate that the
employee exercised discretion, and 2) that choice was grounded in
"social, economic, or political policy."
III. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION APPLIED
TO AN MSHA INSPECTOR'S NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
Applying the discretionary function exception test to the negligent
actions of MSHA inspectors has resulted in a split among the circuit
courts of appeals concerning whether the exception bars suits brought
against the federal government. 57 Analyzing the actions of the MSHA
51. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37 (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).
52. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 325.
55. Id. at 323.
56. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315.
57. See Bemaldes v. United States, 81 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the claim was
barred by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA); Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890
(6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the discretionary function exception did not apply to the negligence of
the mine inspectors).
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inspectors in the context of the test, all circuit courts agree that the
actions exercised by mine inspectors require discretion. 58 Thus, courts on
both sides of the issue argue that the first prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert
test as applied to MSHA mine inspectors is met. 59 The disagreement
among the circuits concerns the second prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert
test; that being whether the discretion exercised by the inspector is
grounded in public policy. In Gaubert, the Supreme Court elaborated on
a presumption that if it is found that a federal agent exercises discretion
in carrying out the statute or regulation, then that discretion is grounded
in public policy. 60 If a reviewing court determines that the discretion

exercised by an MSHA inspector is grounded in "social, economic or
political policy," then the inspectors' negligent actions do not create
liability for the federal government, and the claim would be dismissed.6 1
However, if the court determines that the MSHA inspector made a
decision that is not grounded in "social, economic, or political policy,"
then the discretionary function exception would not apply, and the
claimant would be able to bring a claim against the federal government,
subject to establishing a state tort law duty.62
A. Circuit Courts Holding that the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception
Bars Liabilityfor MSHA Inspectors
Negligent Inspection of a Mine
In determining whether the discretionary function exception
precludes liability against the federal government, the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits have held that the government cannot be held liable for
the negligent inspection by a MSHA inspector that results in a miner's
injury or death. 63 The Fourth Circuit employed the two-part
discretionary function exception test as formulated in Berkovitz, and

58. See Bernaldes, 81 F.3d at 429 (explaining that mine inspectors have the discretion to
determine ifa mine is in compliance with the regulations); Myers, 17 F.3d at 895 (arguing "even the
most cursory glance at the plaintiffs wording of these duties shows that they are replete with choice
and, thus, discretion").
59. Id. (finding that the choice in the mine inspectors regulations is sufficient to meet the first
part of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test); Bernaldes, 81 F.3d at 429 (holding that mine inspectors have
discretion to determine if mine is in compliance with the regulation).
60.
61.

Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324-25.
Id.

62.

id.

63. See Bemaldes v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 301, 308 (4th Cir. 1995); Hylin v. United
States, 755 F.2d 551, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1985).
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refined in Gaubert.64 The Seventh Circuit, in a pre-Berkovitz/Gaubert
opinion, relied on the decision of Varig Airlines in its analysis of the
discretionary function exception.65
1. Fourth Circuit: Bernaldes v. United States
In Bernaldes v. United States,66 the estate of Denny Bernaldes
brought a wrongful death action against the United States, alleging that
three MSHA inspectors had negligently inspected a mine in Virginia.67
The plaintiff claimed that had it not been for the MSHA inspectors'
negligence, Bernaldes would not have fallen through a coal chute where
he was buried alive by eight tons of coal.68 Specifically, the estate
alleged that the mine inspectors failed to cite the mine operator for
deficiencies in railings, grates or safety harness by the coal chute and
inadequate communication of workers inside and outside of the coal
shed. 69 Following Bemaldes' accident at the mine, a MSHA inspector
cited the mine operator for many of the same violations that Bernaldes
alleged in his lawsuit. 70 The magistrate judge issued a "Report and
Recommendation" arguing that the district court judge reject the
government's motion to dismiss.71 The government argued that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the
discretionary function exception barred the plaintiff from bringing the
suit.72 The plaintiff argued that the discretionary function exception did

not apply. 73 The district court rejected the magistrate's findings and
dismissed the case. 74 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
opinion using the same reasoning. 75
The court applied the two-part Berkovitz/Gauberttest in concluding
that the discretionary function exception barred the suit. First, the court
determined that the structure of the regulations promulgated by MSHA

64.
65.
66.

Bernaldes, 877 F. Supp. at 305-06.
Hylin, 755 F.2d at 553.
877 F. Supp. 301 (4th Cir. 1995).

67. Id. at 303.
68. Id. at 303-04.
69.

Id. at 304.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
81 F.3d 428, 429. The Fourth Circuit fully endorsed the reasoning of the district court and

referred readers to the district court's opinion for elaboration. Id.
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were fundamentally discretionary.7 6 The court cited the example of the
discretion a mine inspector used to determine whether there was a
violation significant enough to use safety belts.77 The court reasoned that

"the inspectors must exercise a considerable degree of choice and
judgment when determining if an operation is in compliance with the
agency's safety policies., 78 Further, the court explained: "the regulations
do not 'specifically prescribe a course of action,' that the inspectors must
follow., 79 The district court concluded that in several areas of the
inspection, the inspectors must determine whether the conditions warrant
a violation. 80 The court argued that the inspection process itself was
discretionary by its very nature.81 Citing a decision of the Seventh
Circuit, the district court found that even in areas with objective nondiscretionary regulations, the inspection process itself represented a
discretionary process protected by the exception. 82 The Bernaldes court
determined that the first prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test was
satisfied.83
Next, the court analyzed the policy prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert
test. The court explained that in consideration of the exception, "courts
must be concerned not only with second-guessing policy decisions of the
federal agencies and agents, but also with disrupting the regulatory
efforts of the federal government by exposing the government to tort
liability for negligence in the course of carrying out the policies of a
regulatory regime. 84 The plaintiff argued that the court should follow
the decisions of the Sixth Circuit, that MSHA inspectors are not
authorized to weigh the policy implications of the various safety
regulations and statutes on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the inspectors
have an objective obligation to determine whether the mine operator is
complying with the regulations of the Mine Act, and if not, to issue a
citation for non-compliance. 86 The Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded
that policy considerations do not always come into play when a MSHA
inspector makes a compliance determination. The Bernaldes court

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Bernaldes, 877 F. Supp. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 305-06.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
Id.

85.

Bernaldes,877 F. Supp. at 307.

86. Id.
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rejected the argument put forth by the plaintiff. 87 The court concluded

that the Sixth Circuit incorrectly interpreted the tests laid down in
Berkovitz and Gaubert.88 The court held for the government, accepting
the argument that the discretionary function exception applies because
there is a presumption that the inspector's action was done on the basis
of policy reasons, to protect the health and safety of miners 89 In
upholding the government's motion to dismiss, the court reiterated that
the "plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support the conclusion that the
inspectors engaged in activities beyond the scope of their policy based
responsibilities and thus beyond 'the purview of the policies behind the
statutes.'"90
2. Seventh Circuit: Hylin v. United States
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion to the Bernaldes
court in a per curiam opinion in Hylin v. United States.91 The plaintiff's
husband was electrocuted and killed when he walked passed an electrical
junction box. 92 Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration
("MESA") inspectors that recently inspected the mine noticed the
dangers of the electric box, but failed to investigate or inspect it. 93 The
plaintiff alleged that the MESA inspectors negligently failed to inspect
the box, proximately causing the plaintiffs husband's death. 94 The
government alleged that the discretionary function exception barred any
lawsuit. 95 The district court found for the plaintiff, rejecting the
government's argument that the discretionary function exception barred
the claim. 96 The Seventh97Circuit reversed the district court's decision in

favor of the government.
Using Varig Airlines as its guideline, the Seventh Circuit began its
analysis by focusing not on the actor, but on the "nature of the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
755 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1985) (at the time this action was first filed, the controlling

statute was the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, which authorized the Mine

Enforcement and Safety Administration to conduct inspections).
92. Id. at 552.
93. Id.
94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97. Idat 551.
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challenged governmental activity." 98 Thus, the fact that a MESA
inspector was negligent has no impact on whether the discretionary
function exception applies; what is crucial, though, is whether the
administrative agency has been statutorily given discretion when
exercising its duties under the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine
Safety Act of 1966. 99 The court concluded that in "fulfilling their
inspection and enforcement duties" under the Act, "MESA inspectors
are required to exercise discretion."' 1° Relying on the rulings of Varig
Airlines, the court held that the discretionary function exception barred
the plaintiffs tort claim because the actions of the MESA inspectors
required discretion in carrying out the regulations of the Federal Metal
and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966.1°1
Both the Fourth Circuit and Seventh Circuit held that the
discretionary function exception barred injured miners from bringing
claims against the government for the negligent inspection by a federal
mine inspector.102 Both circuits found that the necessary element of
discretion was present in mine inspectors' actions when carrying out
their duties.10 3 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit, using the
Berkovitz/Gauberttest, held that the discretion authorized to the MSHA
inspectors was grounded in policy considerations. 104 The opinion reads:
Congress stated that protecting the health and safety of the nation's
coal miners is one of the purposes of the Act. When applying the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute, MSHA inspectors must
base their inspections on the policy of promoting the health and safety of
the nation's coal miners, since enforcement of health and safety
standards is the purpose of the inspections. 10
In Gaubert, the court held that once a reviewing court finds that a
federal agent exercises discretion in carrying out a statute or regulation,
then it is presumed that the discretion is grounded in public policy. 106
Following the precedent set in Gaubert, the Fourth Circuit held that the
MSHA inspector exercised discretion in carrying out his duties as
prescribed in the Mine Act; therefore, it was presumed that the MSHA
inspector made determinations based upon furthering the ultimate policy
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 554.
Id.at 553-54.
See Berlandes, 877 F. Supp. at 301; Hylin, 755 F.2d at 551.
See Berlandes, 877 F. Supp. at 306; Hylin, 755 F.2d at 554.
See Berlandes, 877 F. Supp. at 308.
See id. (internal citations omitted).
Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324-25.
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behind the Mine Act, to protect the health and safety of miners. 0 7 The
court declared, "[c]learly, a MSHA inspector's safety compliance
determination is 'based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks
to accomplish."",10 8 Even if the compliance determination made by the
MSHA inspector were negligent, the Fourth Circuit would not find the
government liable because the discretionary function exception would
still apply.
The Seventh Circuit came up with the same result while applying a
different test. The Seventh Circuit did not have to analyze policy
considerations because the court relied on the pre-Berkovitz/Gaubert
decision of Varig Airline opinion, which only required the element of
discretion in order for the discretionary function exception to apply.
Currently, the Seventh Circuit has not heard a case regarding the
negligent inspection by a MSHA inspector.
B. Circuit Courts Holding that the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception
Does Not Bar Liabilityfor MSHA Inspectors
Negligently Inspecting a Mine
The Tenth, Sixth and Fifth Circuits have all held that the
discretionary function exception does not immunize the government
from liability when a negligent inspection by a MSHA inspector results
in the injury or death of a miner.' 0 9 The Tenth and Sixth Circuits used
the Berkovitz/Gaubert two-part test to analyze if the discretionary
function exception applied to the actions of MSHA inspectors," 0 while
the Fifth Circuit used Varig Airlines and Dalehite v. United States"' in
its analysis.' 2

107.

Bernaldes, 877 F. Supp. at 308.

108. Id.at307.
109. See generally Ayala v. U.S., 980 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992); Myers v. U.S., 17 F.3d 890
(6th Cir. 1994); Collins v. U.S., 783 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the discretionary

function exception does not bar liability against the government for a negligent inspection by a mine
inspector).
110.
111.
112.

See Ayala, 980 F.2d at 1347-48; Myers, 17 F.3d at 895.
346U.S. 15(1953).
Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1986).
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1. Sixth Circuit: Myers v. United States
In Myers v. United States, 1 3 a methane gas explosion killed the
plaintiff and seven other miners in the area. 1 4 The plaintiffs alleged that
the failure of the MSHA inspector to perform seven duties arising under
the Mine Act and regulations gave rise to government liability." 5 The
plaintiffs' complaint relied on the inspector's negligence, specifically,
that the MSHA inspector failed to find a number of safety violations
during a previous inspection, which ultimately would have prevented the
explosion." 16 The district court granted the government's motion to
dismiss holding that the discretionary function exception of the FTCA
barred the plaintiffs' claims. 117 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, finding that the discretionary function exception does
not bar the plaintiffs from bringing a claim against the government;
however, the court still dismissed the suit because
the plaintiffs' claim
8
would not be actionable under state tort law."
In determining whether the discretionary function exception applies
to bar liability, the Sixth Circuit used the two-prong test formulated in
Berkovitz and Gaubert."9 The first part of the test asks whether "the
authority under which the action was taken allows the actor discretion to
choose from among alternative courses of action."'' 20 The court found
that all of the duties alleged in the complaint involve an "if/then"
structure, 12 and this conditional assessment is a decision that the MSHA
inspector has to make before being bound to take any action. 122 This
choice on the part of the MSHA
inspector satisfies the first part of the
23
1
analysis.
Berkovitz/Gaubert
The second part of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test asks whether "the
actor is authorized to make those choices on the basis of 'social,
113. 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994).
114. Id. at 893.
115. Id. at 892-93.
116. See id.at893.
117. Id.at 894.
118. See id.
119. See id.at 895.
120. Id. at 895. Specifically, in following the statutory duty, does the mine inspector have to
make a decision or does the statute compel the inspector to take a specific action? See id.
121. Id. For example, one of the duties in the complaint states that the MSHA inspectors failed
"to disapprove unsafe and inadequate ventilation plans proposed by mine operators." Id. at 893.
Thus, "if' the MSHA inspector determines that the ventilation plans are unsafe and inadequate,
"then" the statute mandates the inspector to disapprove of the plans. See id.
122. Idat 895.
123. Id.
at 896.
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The overall goal of the Mine Act is to

protect the health and safety of miners by preventing mine operators
from operating hazardous mines. 125 In doing this, it must balance the
interest of the mine operator by having regulations that are economically
feasible and physically appropriate, and also use MSHA resources in
their most cost-effective manner. 126 The court began its analysis by
explaining that the above policy considerations have already been
promulgated, by both Congress and the Secretary of Labor, in the
statutes and regulations that authorize how MSHA inspectors are
supposed go about inspecting mines.12 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
added that MSHA inspectors make their choices and assessments based
only on "their own observations, informed by professional judgment and
knowledge of the industry" and are not statutorily authorized to make
any of their decisions based on "social, economic, or political
policy. ,128 Since no "policy" decision played a part in the choices made
by MSHA inspectors, the court held 1that
inspectors are not protected by
29
the discretionary function exception.
2. Tenth Circuit: Ayala v. United States
In Ayala v. United States,' 30 the plaintiffs alleged that the MSHA
inspector who inspected the mine offered faulty technical assistance that
31
contributed to an explosion in the coal mine, killing fifteen miners.'
The advice allegedly offered by the MSHA inspector was based on the
requirements of lighting fixtures that are attached to mining
equipment. 132 One of the plaintiffs' major claims was that the MSHA
inspector whom inspected the mine offered incorrect technical advice
concerning how to resolve the lighting situation, which eventually lead

124.

Id. at 895. Specifically, is the MSHA inspector statutorily authorized to make his decision

on the basis of public policy? See id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See
See
See
Id.
See
980

30 U.S.C. § 801(a), (g).
Myers, 17 F.3d at 898.
id.
id.
F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992).

131. See id. at 1346-47. Although the plaintiffs alleged a second claim, that the MSHA
inspector failed to enforce detected violations of MSHA safety regulations, the plaintiffs failed to
show that the MSHA inspector was negligent and the court of appeals did not have to rule on the
district courts further finding that the discretionary function exception would have barred the
plaintiffs' claim anyways. See id. at 1347, 1353.
132. Ayala, 980 F.2d at 1346.
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to the blast.133 The district court held that the13 4claim was barred by the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA.
The court used the Berkovitz/Gaubert test to analyze whether the
discretionary function exception applies to the plaintiffs' claim, the same
two-part test as was used in Myers. 135 The plaintiffs conceded that the
MSHA inspector had discretion in offering the technical advice, thus
satisfying the first part of the test. 136 The plaintiffs shrewdly argued,
however, that the decision being challenged is not that the inspector gave
the technical advice, but that the said advice did not follow the objective
criteria as specified in the MSHA regulations. 137 The Tenth Circuit
explained that the advice given by the MSHA inspector was "governed
solely by technical consideration" found in the MSHA regulations. 138 No
policy decision played a role in the specific advice offered by the MSHA
inspector, and accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding that the discretionary function exception barred the government
39
from being held liable for the MSHA inspector's negligence. 1
3. Fifth Circuit: Collins v. United States
In Collins v. United States, 140 the plaintiffs alleged that the MSHA
inspector's termination of an "Imminent Danger Order" and failure to
reclassify the mine as "gassy" led to an explosion that killed five
miners. 14 The Fifth Circuit, rejecting the defendant's argument that the
holding in Varig Airlines extends to all conduct that is regulatory in
nature, correctly interpreted Varig Airlines and Dalehite to mean that
discretion occurs not only if there is a choice that the official has to
make, but if that choice is grounded in policy concerns. 42 In holding
that the MSHA inspector's decision to terminate the "Imminent Danger
Order" did not fall under the discretionary function exception, the court

133. Id. at 1346-47.
134. Id. at 1347.
135. See id. at 1347-48.
136. Id. at 1348.
137. See id. at 1349. The district court did not rule on the specific advice given, but on the
inspector's decision to offer the advice. Id. The ruling made by the district court, in this sense,
might not have been wrong since an inspector's decision to offer the assistance might be based on
policy decisions. See id. at 1350.
138. Id. at 1349.
139. See id. at 1350.
140.
141.

783 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1230.

142. See id. at 1229-30.
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was hesitant to base its holding on the regulation considerations. 43 The
court made clear that the decision to terminate the "Imminent Danger
Order" may be related to "social, economic or political policy," but since
the government did not address how the decision was based on policy,
the discretionary function exception did not apply. 144 The court's
reasoning as to why the discretionary function exception did not apply is
different than in similar cases analyzing the discretionary function
exception, since this case was decided before Berkovitz and Gaubert.
Conversely, courts after the decisions in Berkovitz and Gaubert have
interpreted the policy decision prong on whether the statute itself
authorizes the actor 1to
make a decision on the basis on "social, economic
45
or political policy."'

In comparing the circuits which held that the discretionary function
exception does not apply to MSHA inspectors, allowing the government
to be found liable in such lawsuits, the Sixth Circuit has the broadest
view, holding that MSHA inspectors can never make determinations
based on "social, economic or political policy.'

46

The Sixth Circuit

noted that MSHA inspectors are unable to make policy decisions since
the policies behind the regulations and the Mine Act have already been
promulgated, by both Congress and the Secretary of Labor. 147
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, explains that MSHA
inspectors might have choices that could be based on policy decisions
depending on the regulation involved. 148 When a regulation is purely
"technical," as was the case in Ayala, 149 then the government would not
be able to use the discretionary function exception as a defense to bar
liability to a MSHA inspector negligently adhering to that "technical"
regulation, since no policy decision would have played a part in the
MSHA inspector's decision. 5 ° If, though, the regulation is not technical
in nature, but gives discretion to the mine inspector in allowing the
inspector to make his/her decision for a policy reason, then the mine
inspector's decision might be protected by the discretionary function

143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 1230.
Id.
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
See, e.g., Myers, 17 F.3d at 897.

147. Id. at 898.
148. See Ayala, 980 F.2dat 1350.
149. Id. at 1350 (explaining that "(t]he wiring of the lights had to conform to the mandatory
MSHA regulation requiring that the lights be de-energized by the methane monitor.").
150. See id.
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exception. 151 For example, the statute dealing with erecting an
emergency shelter might be a statute that the Tenth Circuit holds is
protected by the discretionary function exception, since the statute is not
purely technical, but authorizes the inspector the ability to select a
"suitable location" for an emergency shelter, thus granting the inspector
52
discretion in his or her decision. 1
The Fifth Circuit did not focus on the statutes or regulations in
determining whether they involve a policy decision; rather, the focus
was on whether the government could offer a policy reason for the
action taken by the MSHA inspector.15 3 The Fifth Circuit offers an
example of how policy considerations might come into play to allow the
discretionary function exception to bar the government from liability:
"the attempted rescue of a trapped miner might well justify entry into a
'gassy' mine even though required safety equipment was inoperable, so
that an order forbidding entry in such circumstances might properly be
annulled."'' 54 The Fifth Circuit, though, has not analyzed this issue since
Berkovitz and Gaubert,and thus focuses not on whether the statutes and
regulations direct the mine inspector to make his/her decision based on
"social, economic or political policy," but on whether the government
argue that the inspector made his/her decision on a
can affirmatively
1 55
basis.
policy
IV. APPLICATION OF THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
IN OTHER INDUSTRIES

The discretionary function exception of the FTCA has not only
been litigated throughout the mining industry, but has also been applied
to bar liability against the government in other industries, where the
government has been statutorily granted regulatory power to enforce
safety standards.

151. See e.g., id. (30 U.S.C. § 952(b) leaves it up to the MSHA investigator to offer, if any,
technical advice, and if the MSHA investigator decides to limit, or not offer, any advice, this
limitation might be based on a policy decision "reflecting a need to balance the ultimate goal of
safety with the reality of finite agency resources.").
152. Id. The decision to erect or not erect an emergency shelter, or about where the emergency
shelter should be, might be based on balancing out the monetary costs of building such a shelter and
the safety of the miners.
153. See Collins, 783 F.2dat 1230.
154. Id. at 1231.
155. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
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In FisherBrothers Sales v. United States, 15 6 the plaintiffs sued the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") claiming that the FDA
improperly banned the importation of Chilean fruit and improperly
destroyed the Chilean fruit already in the United States.' 57 Plaintiffs'
complaint was based upon the theory that the FDA violated its own
regulatory procedural manual, which led to the commissioner issuing the
order that resulted in the banning and destruction of Chilean fruit.'58 The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the FDA the ability to
"recall" food in the food distribution chain whenever such food poses a
risk to consumers and a recall is needed to protect the health of the
consumers in the US. 159 The initiation of the recall is a judgment to be
made by FDA officials based on "the degree of seriousness of the health
hazard" and "the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard."' 160 In Fisher
Brothers, the government argued that the decision made by the FDA was
discretionary and thus protected by the discretionary function
exception. 16 1 The district court granted the government's motion to
62
dismiss, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
Both the district court and the Third Circuit turned to the leading cases
on the discretionary function exception in analyzing the plaintiffs'
claim. 63 In finding that the discretionary function exception applied, the
district court concluded that the FDA made a choice, and that that choice
was grounded in "policy" concerns:
Under [the FFDCA], the FDA had the discretion to act during the
Chilean grape crisis. The FDA acted to protect the public from the risk
of exposure to poisonous fruit which it learned could be coming from
Chile. It had the discretion to test the fruit and determine whether the
fruit was adulterated. It also had the discretion to refuse entry into the
United States. The actions taken were not violative of any regulatory or
statutory provisions. The acts taken were in accordance with the FDA's
authority to determine whether or not a specific product should be
allowed entrance into the United States. This conduct is grounded in the
policy of protecting the public health. The actions were clearly in
furtherance of the FDA's statutory mission to protect the American
156.
157.

46 F.3d 279.
Id.at 283.

158. Id.
159. Id. at 285 (internal citations omitted).
160. 21 C.F.R. § 7.41(a)(4)(5) (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 7.40(b) (2005).
161. See FisherBros. Sales, 46 F.3d at 283.
162. Id. at 283, 288.
163. See id. at 285-86 (applying Varig Airlines, Berkovitz, and Gaubert in deciding whether the
discretionary function exception of the FrCA shields the government from liability).
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public from adulterated food. All -the acts involved judgment and choice
and were grounded in policy.' 64
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion,
explaining that the decision made by the FDA, in light of the
surrounding circumstances, was a decision grounded in "social,
165
economic, and political policy."

In Irving v. United States,'66 the plaintiff claimed that compliance
officers from the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
("OSHA") had acted negligently in their duty to inspect a manufacturing
plant, proximately causing the plaintiffs injuries. 167 In holding that
liability is barred by the discretionary function exception, the court used
the two-part test as developed in Berkovitz and Gaubert.168 In its
opinion, the court distinguished OSHA from the Mine Act by
emphasizing that Congress "mandated comprehensive inspections" in
the statute while, Congress left the "scope and detail" of OSHA
inspections mainly up to the Secretary's discretion. 169 The flexibility of
the statute's framework gives OSHA inspectors a less rigid regime to
follow when carrying out the obligations of the statute and the
regulations. 170 The overall policy of the statute, followed by all OSHA
compliance officers, is to ensure "adequate safety in workplaces with a
view toward efficient and effective use of limited enforcement
resources." 171 In this sense, OSHA compliance officers must make dayto-day decisions regarding what risks and safety issues require their most
urgent attention, and then make their inspections based on these
perceived risks and hazards. 172 The court goes on to explain that "[t]he
OSH Act . . . places primary responsibility for workplace safety on
173

employers, not on the federal government."'

164.
165.

Balmaceda v. U.S., 815 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Penn. 1992).
Fisher Bros. Sales, 46 F.3d at 285. The court goes on to explain that allowing such a

claim as the one plaintiffs bring would create huge social costs due to tremendous liability issues
that would arise throughout the FDA and restrict and impair the FDA commissioner in his decision
making process. Id. at 286-87.
166.

162 F.3d 154 (lst Cir. 1998)

167. Id. at 158.
168. Id. at 163-64, 68 (finding that the OSHA compliance officers had discretion, and that that
discretion was grounded in policy).
169. Id.at 163.
170. Id.
171. Id.at 169.
172. id. at 168-69.
173. Id. at 169 (citing 29 U.S.C § 654(a); Reich v. Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., 3 F.3d 1,
4 (1st Cir. 1993)).
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The discretionary function exception is not limited only to the
mining industry; it is used throughout any industry where the
government has been statutorily granted power to regulate workplace
safety. The discretionary function exception is a powerful statute that
gives the government an increased ability to avoid liability from issues
that might arise when the negligent acts of an agent of the government
proximately causes a harm to another.
V. REASONS WHY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS
BY A MSHA INSPECTOR

There are four reasons why negligent actions by MSHA inspectors
should not be protected by the discretionary function exception,
therefore, allowing the federal government to be liable in tort for the
harms MSHA inspectors proximately cause to miners. First, allowing the
inspectors protection under the discretionary function exception would
give the regulators the sweeping protection from liability that the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Berkovitz. Second, mine inspectors
do not use policy considerations in making decisions since the Secretary
of Labor and Congress, acting through the MSHA, has already
promulgated those policy considerations into the regulations of the Mine
Act. Further, allowing MSHA inspectors to make case-by-case decisions
would not only circumvent the power of Congress, but also the power
that the Mine Act authorizes to the MSHA representatives that develop
and promulgate the regulations. Third, miners depend on the federal
government to compel mine operators to maintain minimum federal
safety and health standards in the mines since workers compensation
laws usually bar the miners from directly suing their employers.1 74 By
allowing injured miners to bring claims against the federal government
for negligent inspections by MSHA inspectors, the inspectors are more
likely to perform their inspections with a greater degree of care. Fourth,
the inspectors do not exercise the kind of discretion that Congress
intended to exempt from tort liability in the discretionary function
exception.
First, if the federal mine inspectors' negligence was protected by
the discretionary function exception, this would create the kind of broad

174. See Oral Argument at 9, U.S. v. Olson, No. 04-759, 2005 WL 2757518 (U.S.), 74 USLW
3270 (Oct. 12, 2005).
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protection for regulators that Berkovitz explicitly rejected.' 7 5 The
Supreme Court wrote, "[i]n restating and clarifying the scope of the
discretionary function exception, we intend specifically to reject the
Government's argument... that the exception precludes liability for any
and all acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal
agencies.' 176 Citing both the language of the statute and the legislative
history, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not intended to
bar liability for all regulatory functions. 177 If the mine inspectors'
negligence in performing an inspection fulfilled the second Berkovitz
prong, then this would create a wholesale regulatory bar to liability that
the Supreme Court had specifically rejected. This bar to liability would
have such an effect, because a mine worker would be unable to attack
the process of creating the regulations, and the same mine worker would
be unable to compel competent compliance by the inspector with the
regulations through an action in tort. By enabling an injured worker to
bring an action in tort against the government for the negligent
inspections by MSHA inspectors, this would allow the MSHA to retain
the discretion of the policy underlying the regulations, while
encouraging competent inspections by MSHA inspectors.
Second, mine inspectors do not make their decisions on any "social,
economic or political policy" basis since Congress and the Secretary of
Labor, acting through the MSHA, have already considered both the
interest of the miners and the mine operators when promulgating and
revising the regulations and the Mine Act for the inspectors to
enforce. 178 Further, affording the government protection against MSHA
inspectors who are negligent in carrying out the provisions of the
regulations would give mine inspectors the ability to make their
decisions on a case-by-case analysis, ultimately diluting the power of
both Congress and the MSHA. The discretionary function exception
should not apply to the inspector's actions because the Mine Act and

175. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538.
176. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538; see also Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322 (holding the plaintiff could
not attack in tort the claim of the plaintiff that the broad latitude granted the federal agency was
negligent).
177. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538-39 (explaining that the language Congress chose was
discretionary not regulatory). The Court also explained in a footnote that the legislative history
while calling for a bar to liability for some regulatory agencies specifically rejected the kind of
broad bar to liability that the government supported. Id. at n.4 ("However, the common-law torts of
employees of regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the bill to the same extent
as torts of nonregulatory agencies").
178.

See Myers, 17 F.3d at 898.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

436

[Vol. 23:413

his/her
regulations do not authorize the mine inspectors to consider
' 179
policy."
political
or
economic,
"social,
of
basis
the
on
decision
The overall public policy of protecting the miners from health and
safety concerns by preventing mine operators from operating dangerous
mines is objectively codified by both Congress and the Secretary of
Labor in the regulations and Mine Act that they developed concerning
mine inspections. The Secretary is specifically authorized to "develop,
promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, improved mandatory
health or safety standards for the protection of life and prevention of
injuries in coal or other mines."'1 80 These standards are developed by the
appointed representative of the Secretary, who is required to have either
practical experience in mining, experience as a mining engineer, or by
education. 181 In this respect, the mine inspector's job is to determine
whether the mine operator has complied with the standard, and if not, to
issue the citations and orders as specified by the statute or regulation. 182
When the specific statute or regulation authorizes the inspector to make
a choice,'8 3 this decision is to be made not on grounds of "social,
economic or political policy" in furtherance of the statute or regulation,
but on the inspector's professional opinion and inherent knowledge in
the field. 184 In Gaubert, the court explained the policy judgment that
played a role in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board decisions to "advise
about and oversee certain aspects of the operation"'' 8 5 of the Independent
American Savings Association (IASA):
The federal regulators here had two discrete purposes in mind as they
commenced day-to-day operations at IASA. First, they sought to
protect the solvency of the savings and loan industry at large, and
maintain the public's confidence in that industry. Second, they sought
to preserve the assets of IASA for the benefit of depositors and
shareholders, of which Gaubert was one.186
179.
180.
181.
182.

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37.
30 U.S.C. § 811.
30 U.S.C. § 954.
In Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Gaubert, he explained that "the higher the actor

stands in a particularly agency, the stronger the presumption that he is afforded discretion to devise
public policy. Conversely, the lower the status of the actor, the less likely it is that he is authorized
to set policy and the more likely he is to merely implement the policy choices of others." Myers, 17

F.3d at 896 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
183.

See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 814(d)(1) (making the decision that an "imminent danger" exists); see

also, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 875 (making the decision where to erect a "rescue chamber").
184.
185.

See Myers, 17 F.3d 898.
Gaubert,499 U.S. at 318.

186.

Id. at 352-53 (internal citations omitted).
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In Varig Airlines, the court explained how FAA employees were
making policy decisions when executing a "spot-check" program in
compliance with the Federal Aviation Act of 1955:
The FAA employees who conducted compliance reviews of the aircraft
involved in this case were specifically empowered to make policy
judgments regarding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be
placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with
FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency resources. In
administering the "spot-check" program, these FAA engineers and
inspectors necessarily took certain calculated risks, but those risks
were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose and
pursuant to the slpecific grant of authority in the regulations and
operating manuals.
In contrast to Varig Airlines and Gaubert, there are no policy
reasons that play a role in the decision of mine inspectors when
conducting inspections. Each statute and regulation has already codified
the overall policy behind the measures that being protecting the health
and safety of miners. Thus, when a negligent inspection occurs, resulting
in a miner's death or injury, the argument that the mine inspector's
decision was made on the basis of "social, economic or political policy"
would be implausible since the overall goal of the Mine Act and
regulations are to protect the health and safety of the miners. For
example, a mine inspector, in carrying out a regulation, negligently
makes a decision as the regulation provides, and this negligent decision
proximately causes the injury to a miner. The government, thereupon,
argues that the mine inspector made his/her decision, although negligent,
in furtherance of the ultimate goal of the regulation to protect the safety
of the miner. It would be illogical, in this situation, to allow the
discretionary function exception to bar liability against the government,
because the policy consideration of protecting the health and safety of
miners was not furthered. Any such "policy" reason that the government
might claim that the mine inspector's decision was grounded in, could
not be one that was made in protecting the health and safety of the
miners, since the miner was injured or killed due to the MSHA
inspector's decision.
Further, mine inspectors should not have the power to make
decisions on the basis of "policy" since this would give mine inspectors
the ability to do a case-by-case analysis, undermining the regulatory
187.

Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 678-79.
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scheme of the MSHA. Congress developed the Mine Act to give certain
MSHA representatives the statutory authority to "develop and
promulgate" any new regulation that would improve upon the health or
safety standard of all the nation's mines. 188 The mine inspectors' duties
are not to create their own standards in regards to the health and safety
of miners, but to follow and carry out the rules and regulations as
specified in the Mine Act. Giving mine inspectors the ability to make a
case-by-case analysis and weigh the interests of the overall goal behind
the Mine Act and the regulations themselves, would be giving mine
inspectors more power than the developers of the Mine Act.
Third, mine workers rely substantially upon the federal government
to force mine operators to comply with minimum safety standards. This
reliance is due to mainly the statute's regulatory scheme, which seeks
not to encourage compliance through self-regulation or self-audit, but
through strict rules set out by the MSHA, carried out by inspectors, and
followed by all mine operators. 189 Without self-regulation by miners and
mine operators themselves, the mandatory inspections, that the MSHA is
required by law to perform, are necessary and essential in order to
protect the safety and health of the 320,000 mine workers in the United
States.1 90 Since the statute gives no incentives to mine operators to
develop their own safety and health programs to protect their workers,
without inspections and enforcement by the MSHA, the safety and
health of all the mine workers in the U.S. would be jeopardized and
threatened. Further, most states do not allow miners to sue the mine
operator since any injury that occurs to the miner during his employment
would be covered by workers compensation laws. 191
By holding the federal government liable for a negligent inspection
by a MSHA inspector, the government would be forced to maximize the
quality of every mine inspector to ensure that each inspector exercises
the utmost care in performance of his or her duties. The safety and health
of each miner would be vastly improved due to enhanced inspections by
all MSHA inspectors. Further, mine workers will have the added
assurance that their employer is operating a mine free from any safety or
health hazards that might cause injury or death.

188. 30 U.S.C. § 801(g); see also 30 U.S.C. § 954.
189. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 455.
at
Glance,
At
a
Health
and
Safety
Mine
190. MSHA,
http://msha.gov/MSHAINFO/lnjuryRates/CYMSHAInjuryInfo2OO4-06-14.doc (last visited Jan. 10,
2006); see also 30 U.S.C. § 813(a).
191. See supra note 174.
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Fourth and finally, MSHA inspectors do not exercise the policy
discretion that Congress intended to protect through the discretionary
function exception. 92 From the legislative history, it is evident that
Congress contemplated giving certain regulatory agencies, specifically
the "Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange
Commission," broad protection from liability, but ultimately rejected
such protection. 93 Congress explained that the exception was meant to
protect the agencies from a suit in tort to "test the validity .. . [or]

constitutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or regulation..
.through the medium of a damage suit for tort."' 194 Yet, none of these
concerns are raised in a suit over the negligent inspection of a mine by a
MSHA inspector. The plaintiff-miner accepts the regulatory scheme of
the MSHA and hopes that the inspections are performed without
negligence to ensure the safety of the worker. An injured miner's suit,
therefore, does not diminish or challenge the policy underlying the
regulations or "second-guess" the policy decisions; rather it seeks to
affirm such policy through the tort action. The miner seeks that the
policy underlying the statute and regulations, the health and safety of the
miner, is protected through competent inspections by MSHA inspectors.
VI: FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON
PLAINTIFF-MINE WORKERS
BRINGING TORT CLAIMS AGAINST
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Even after a court declares that the MSHA inspectors' discretion is
not grounded in policy, there are still two major restrictions that a
plaintiff must overcome in order to be able to bring a claim for the
negligent safety inspection of a mine. First, the miner must allege that
the tort committed by the mine inspector would be a tort if the action
was committed by a private individual in the state in which the
inspection occurred. Second, a plaintiff must allege facts that support a
finding that the mine inspector was negligent in the manner in which he
or she inspected the mine. In these allegations, the plaintiff may not
allege that MSHA is negligent in the manner in which safety and health
95
regulations are promulgated or enforced. 1
192.
193.
194.
195.

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538-39 n.4.
Id.
Id.
This means that a plaintiff may not allege that MSHA was negligent in failing to

promulgate a certain safety standard or that the generalized enforcement methods set forth by
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The FTCA makes the federal government liable for torts committed
by its employees in the scope of their employment if those tortuous96
actions would have been a tort, if committed by a private individual.1
This means that a mine worker-plaintiff must prove the existence of
some state law tort duty owed to the worker from the mine inspector.' 97
Unless the plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to justify liability under
ordinary state-law principles, and thus invoked the court's subject
matter jurisdiction under the general waiver of sovereign immunity in
[FTCA],
there is no need to resort to the exceptions [], to dismiss the
19 8
suit.

The Sixth Circuit explained that although the mine inspectors'
actions were not grounded in public policy, and therefore were not
barred by the discretionary function exception, the plaintiffs failed to
establish that the mine inspector owed the injured workers a state tort
law duty.' 99 While the argument that MSHA inspectors are not protected
by the discretionary function exception may seem to enlarge the liability
of the government, the state tort law duty requirement prevents "opening
the floodgates of litigation."
Secondly, the plaintiff must allege facts which fall outside the
protected policy discretion of regulatory agencies. This means that the
mine worker's factual allegations must be limited to the negligent
inspection of the mine. Once the mine worker alleges that either a
statute, regulation, or the process of making the regulations promulgated
by MSHA is negligent, those actions are protected by the discretionary
function exception, even though they may be negligent. The plaintiffmine worker needs to allege facts which are more analogous to those
alleged in the third Berkovitz factual situation than those alleged by the
plaintiffs in both Varig Airlines and Gaubert.200 The mine worker would

MSHA are negligent. Rather, the plaintiff must allege facts, which demonstrate that on a certain
date, the MSHA inspector failed to perform his or her inspection in a competent manner.
196. D. Scott Barash, Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and Mandatory
Regulations, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1300, 1300-01 (1987).
197. See supra note 190-92 and accompanying text (exploring the requirement of the FTCA

that a plaintiff establish an analogous private liability in order to sustain the action).
198. Myers, 17 F.3d at 898-99 (explaining that although the discretionary function exception
does not prevent the suit against the mine inspectors, there was no state tort law duty owed to the
plaintiff by the mine inspector).
199. See id.at 901 (holding that although the discretionary function exception did not bar the
suit, the lack of state cause of action prevented the suit from continuing).
200. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 533-34; Varig Airline, 467 U.S. at 799-804; Gaubert,499 U.S.
at 318.
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have to be specific, making it clear that the goal of the suit was not to
change the regulatory scheme adopted by MSHA, but rather, that the
mine inspector was negligent in the actual inspection of the mine. 20 1 This
requirement is the most difficult for plaintiffs because it necessarily
involves the heart of the argument about the discretionary function
exception. A plaintiff who mistakenly pleads that the negligence was
committed by the regulator in making the regulations, will lose the
ability to bring the suit. Only those plaintiffs who allege that the
inspector negligently performed his/her duty, and thus violated a state
tort law duty owed to the worker, will be able to bring their claim under
the FTCA.
CONCLUSION

The goal of the Mine Act is to improve both the health and safety of
mine workers.20 2 With this goal in mind, in applying the
Berkovitz/Gauberttwo-prong discretionary function exception test to the
decisions made by the MSHA inspectors in following the regulatory
scheme of the statute, the second part of the test, the policy prong,
clearly can not apply for four reasons. 20 3 First, allowing governmental
immunity would lead to broad regulatory protection from liability that
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Berkovitz. 204 Second, MSHA
inspectors are not permitted to apply policy considerations in their
inspections since these considerations have already been promulgated
into the regulations and the statute.2 5 Allowing MSHA inspectors to
make determinations on a policy basis would thwart the power that the
Mine Act gave to certain MSHA representatives who developed and
promulgated the regulations.20 6 Third, mine workers depend on the
MSHA inspector, an agent of the federal government, to ensure that their
employer is operating a safe and healthy workplace.20 7 Allowing the
government to escape liability for one of its agents would only foster
higher injury or death rates in the mines subject to the Act, contradicting
with the first two goals of the MSHA. 20 8 Lastly, the inspectors do not
201.
alleging
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See yarig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813-15 (explaining that the plaintiffs could not bring a suit
negligence of the entire FAA regulatory scheme).
30 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2000).
See supra Part IV; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-38; Gaubert,499 U.S. at 324-325.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
U.S. Department of Labor Mine and Health Administration, History of the Mine Safety
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exercise the kind of meaningful policy discretion that Congress intended
to protect by enacting the discretionary function exception. 0 9
The argument in favor of the government incurring liability for the
negligence of the actions of the MSHA inspectors does not necessarily
mean that the government will lose every suit brought against it, or open
a floodgate for these kinds of suits. 210 The restrictions left in place by
both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the nature of the suit itself will
limit the claims brought against the government. A plaintiff still needs to
establish a state tort law duty owed to the plaintiff by the MSHA
inspector. 2 11 Even in the circuits which hold that the discretionary
function exception does not bar liability against the government, a
plaintiffs claim will still be dismissed without the court finding a state
tort law duty.212 For example, in Myers, the court found no bar to the suit
under the discretionary function exception; yet, the claim was still
dismissed because of the plaintiffs failure to establish a state tort law
213
duty.

Moreover, the restriction on the nature of the complaint will
necessarily limit the claims brought against the government. The only
suits that would be exempt from the discretionary function exception
would be those cases where the plaintiff alleges that the inspector
negligently failed to complete his/her inspection, negligently gave the
mine operator the wrong advice, or negligently carried out the duties
provided by the statute or regulation at hand. This would include claims
where the inspector should have caught a violation, but did not.
However, this would not include claims where the plaintiff alleged that
the regulation itself was inadequate to protect the miner's health and
safety.21 4 The decision of what regulations to enact to promote miner
health and safety is clearly still within the protection of the discretionary
function exception. This is the kind of policy-based discretion that
Congress clearly intended to protect from a suit in tort.
This policy of exempting the MSHA mine inspectors from seeking
protection under the discretionary function exception is also justified
based upon a weighing of each of the parties' interests involved in the
case. The federal government seeks to regulate the industry in such a

and Health Legislation, available at? http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.htm.
209. See supra Part V.
210. See supra Part V1.
211. See supra Part VI.
212. Myers, 17 F.3d at 899.
213. Id.
214. See supra Part VI.
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way as to promote miner health and safety through use of its limited
resources. 2 15 The miner wants the government to actively enforce the
statute and regulations to ensure that a mine operator maintains a
minimum standard of health and safety. By allowing a miner to bring a
claim against the federal government, the miner is helping to ensure that
the government fulfills its regulatory function in a competent manner.
Allowing liability in this context gives the miner a direct way to apply
pressure to the government to ensure that the miner can rely upon the
conclusions or determinations made by the MSHA inspector. Ultimately,
this type of liability will help promote the miner's safety
and health, the
216
core goal and purpose in the creation of the Mine Act.
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215. See 30 U.S.C. § 801(a)
216. See id.
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